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ABSTRACT The main characteristic of the financial crises of the nineties was that
they resulted in severe external financial constraints. Today, the “balancing” of the
inflows and outflows of the balance of payments is done by adjusting interest rates,
the key variable of economic policies. The hike in interest rates raises the cost of
borrowing considerably — weakening the position of the states vis-à-vis the federal
State —, and adds to the budget deficit, which cannot be contained merely by re-
ducing public expenditure. It also leads to a reduction in the investment projects of
firms. The financial logic underlying the functioning of a “casino economy” pro-
duces great instability in the economic activity, an acute social vulnerability, and
the impossibility under this growth regime to obtain any significant reduction in
the widespread poverty.
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AMÉRICA LATINA: REPENSANDO A DEPENDÊNCIA FINANCEIRA
RESUMO A característica principal das crises financeiras dos anos noventa foi a
conseqüente severidade das restrições nas finanças exteriores. Hoje, o equilíbrio
entre a entrada de fundos e a saída de fundos do balanço de pagamentos é feito por
meio do ajuste das taxas de juros, a variável-chave da política econômica. O incre-
mento das taxas de juros aumenta consideravelmente o custo dos empréstimos —
enfraquecendo, assim, a posição dos estados em face do governo federal —, além de
aumentar o déficit no orçamento, o qual não pode ser controlado apenas pela con-
tenção das despesas públicas. Essa medida também leva a uma redução nos projetos
de investimentos das empresas. A lógica financeira por trás do funcionamento de
uma “economia de cassino” produz grande instabilidade na atividade econômica e
uma vulnerabilidade social marcante, tornando ainda impossível, sob esse modelo
de crescimento, conseguir qualquer redução substancial na pobreza generalizada.
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nação; volatilidade; vulnerabilidade
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INTRODUCTION
The financial crises of the eighties differed greatly from those of the nineties.
The main characteristics of the former were the magnitude of the external
debt and the obligation to service it with the country’s own resources. The
main characteristics of the latter were the outcome of severe external finan-
cial constraints. In both cases, financial development was essentially a gov-
ernment concern. It characterized the differences in growth regimes in the
eighties and in the nineties.
To be more specific, in many respects, the finance–State relationship dif-
fered from those which, giving preference to firms, analyze the impact of fi-
nance and financializing on their investment function. Mynski’s approach,
setting the supply price of capital goods — involving the profit rate (the
“mark up” in the Kaleckian interpretation) — against the demand price —
involving the interest rate — is not very significant, however rich and origi-
nal the analysis. This is not only because credit financing is not common
practice in Latin America, in comparison with developed countries1 —
which does not mean that it is negligible — but, above all, it is because the
low rate of gross capital formation is explained primarily by the rent-seek-
ing tendencies of entrepreneurs — this behaviour being linked to a particu-
larly unequal income structure —, and also because of the opportunities at
hand to choose portfolio investments, in view of the particularly attractive
interest rates offered by government treasury bonds. Both factors have a
similar impact considerably hindering investment, especially in comparison
to Asian economies.
The rise in interest rates should be accompanied by a decline in the value
of assets, a consecutive reduction in the demand for investment goods ef-
fecting a decline in profits, and an increase in interest expenditure. In such
an instance, a Ponzi2-type financial crisis is likely to occur. However, this is
not the most important mechanism. It does not explain why financial crises
occur more frequently in Latin America than in Asian countries.3
It is thus not the gap between the supply and demand price that deter-
mines the level of investment, but the particular context in which entrepre-
neurs act (greater inequalities, high interest rates) which encourages their
rent-seeking behaviour. In other words, the hike in interest rates has an in-
direct effect on investment (credit of course costs more, but, most of all,
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there are more opportunities for a trade-off in favour of financial activities).
Banks buy, or invest in, public debt securities, and their activity is oriented
more towards this function and less towards loans to firms. A financial cri-
sis should be studied in relation to the growth regime and the government’s
economic policy. This is what we will endeavour to do.
The financial crisis did not have the same significance in the eighties as
in the nineties. In both cases, it resembled a Ponzi-type crisis as applied to
the State: domestic resources were not sufficient to service the debt in its
entirety. In the eighties, countries had to sign letters of intent in order to ob-
tain “involuntary” credits to supplement their own resources. In the nine-
ties, access to international financial markets was renewed, but this did not
exclude recourse to “involuntary” credits. In the earlier period, debt servic-
ing generated hyperinflation and a large internal debt. The drop in purchas-
ing power was a consequence of both inflation and the economic crisis. For
a large part of the population, the most impoverished, pauperization was
absolute. In the nineties, the debt was serviced during a period of economic
recovery, with a significant increase in labour productivity. Financial de-
pendence led to the relative pauperization of a significant portion of the
population, except in times of financial crisis or when income levels de-
clined. This is what we will try to show.
THE LOST DECADE AND “VICIOUS FINANCING”
The development of financial activities is not parasitical by nature. Gener-
ally, firms operate in a macroeconomic environment over which they do
not ordinarily have much control, and they do so based on very limited in-
formation. The current complexity of the production process increases un-
certainty with regards to project profitability. Covering new risks also leads
to the development of equally complex financial products. On this account,
the financial market — on the condition that it be sufficiently large and di-
versified, which is not the case in Latin America — can generate new tech-
nologies and consequently ensure the conversion of the production appara-
tus towards the fabrication of increasingly sophisticated industrial
products, by creating financial instruments adapted to risk. The export of
complex products requires not only the intervention of banks and the set-
ting up of a complex and original financial “package”, but also the use of
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financial derivatives to cover a series of risks, including the exchange rate
risk. Thus, the ever more complex organization of the financial market with
regard to its products and their interplay is, to some extent, the result of the
increasing complexity of production. This financial complexity is intensi-
fied with financial liberalization (de-compartmentalization, dis-interme-
diation and deregulation). Of course, there is an additional cost, but the
profits are higher than the costs.4 The development of finance and the in-
crease in sophisticated financial products thus allow for an increase in capi-
tal in abstracto, for the capital cycle occurs only if financial activities favour
the valorization of productive capital. The growth of the industrial sector
requires a more than proportional development of the financial sector.
There is a shift towards “financialization” when these activities are devel-
oped because financial products are attractive per se, and not as a result of a
will to lower the risks in financing production. Financialization is the
threshold from which financial operations, which are more lucrative than
productive activities, are given a fillip, to the detriment of the latter.
From then on, the financial sector appears to be gaining independence
from the productive sector. Like Janus, finance has two faces: a virtuous
side, when it facilitates capital accumulation, and a parasitic side, when it
does so to its detriment. Both aspects coexist: sometimes, one side prevails,
and sometimes, the other, depending on the period and the macroeco-
nomic environment (income distribution, modes of insertion in the global
economy, relationship with the developed economies and international fi-
nancial markets). When the virtuous side prevails over the parasitic side, fi-
nancial activities can be understood as the trade activities analysed by Marx:
they are “indirectly productive”. Financial development is therefore all the
more virtuous when it helps to increase fictitious assets at a time when the
growth of the stock market capitalization is significant: the increase of these
fictitious assets enhances the propensity for consumption by households,
and, as a result, offers additional scope for productive capital valorization.
The rate of investment increases and, with it, the size of the debt, prompted
by the rise in the value of shares held by firms and the increase in their mar-
ket capitalization. This debt, no doubt, is used to finance new investments,
but it is essentially the consequence of the acquisition of assets at high prices
during the fusion (acquisition process). Under these circumstances, finan-
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cial development gives a boost to the growth rate. We are therefore far from
a unilateral interpretation, in which the finance-industry relationship is
conceived solely from the point of view of levying the industrial profits real-
ized through financial operations.
This is not the scenario that characterized the eighties in Latin America.
Far from presenting its “virtuous” side, finance became “vicious”, “perver-
se”. It fostered returns, accentuated the disparities between income from
capital and income from work, undermined accumulation, restricted job
creation and helped create marginalized societies. This is what we are going
to see.
Let us take a brief look at the earlier financial crises: in the early eighties,
Mexico was no longer in a position to service its debt. International finan-
cial markets reacted in an extremely brutal fashion. As a result, Latin Ameri-
can countries, as well as several Asian countries, no longer had access to in-
ternational credit facilities, unless they signed a “letter of intent” with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Henceforth, they must service a sub-
stantial part of their debt from their own domestic sources, while negotiat-
ing with the IMF the rescheduling of another part: the amortization of the
principal. In order to do this, they must now increase exports in order to
achieve a positive net trade balance, and therefore implement policies of
austerity (drastic reduction in public expenditure, substantial devaluation).
At the end of it, exports were expected to exceed imports by about 30%, and
debt servicing would represent between 2% and 5% of the total wealth pro-
duced (GDP), depending on the country and the years, i.e. more than the
war reparations forced on Germany after the First World War by the Treaty
of Versailles. The net flows of capital were reversed: Latin America would
export more capital than it would receive (see figure 1).
The price that is exacted is extremely high: ten years of slump, mainly as
a result of the reduction in public expenditure,5 which translated as fewer
incentives to invest, hyperinflation in several countries as a result of the
massive devaluations, increased poverty and inequality. In such an environ-
ment, the poor are hit even harder by inflation because of their poverty. Ex-
ternal debt servicing is an expenditure that has to be budgeted for two rea-
sons: an important part of the total debt is public, and the foreign exchange
risk component of the private debt is often assumed by the State. Therefore,
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the problem that must be resolved is this: how to appropriate foreign ex-
change generated by devaluations to service the external debt, in view of the
fact that it is not possible to increase the aggregate [global] saving rate. The
massive devaluations, combined with a protectionist policy, aim to release
the surplus of the trade balance and to produce the necessary foreign cur-
rencies to service the external debt. Moreover, they are also responsible for
bringing prices to new heights, thereby de facto increasing forced savings.
They constitute what the neo-structural Latin American economists have
called a “supply shock”. The State issues treasury bonds with rates pegged
first to past inflation, and then to anticipated inflation (that is to say, in fact,
to the exchange rate quoted on parallel markets, the latter being the best in-
dicator of future inflation). It is therefore the hyperinflationary context that
has been created which paradoxically makes government treasury bonds an
attractive proposition. The absolute impoverishment of some makes pos-
sible the absolute affluence of others just as if this was a zero sum game. A
portion of domestic savings can now be transferred, but it has been achieved
only because a process of forced savings took place, and at the cost of a more
widespread dollarization. It appears as though it is the forced savings (in lo-
cal currency) that are servicing the external debt (in dollars), as long as the
rate of voluntary savings does not increase.
Source: Cepal based on official figures. (a) The net transfer of resources (NTR), is calculated by subtracting interest payments on
debt and dividends from the net inflows. Net capital inflow represents the balance of the capital and financial account minus errors
and omissions, loans and utilization of IMF credit, and financing of an exceptional nature. The negative figures indicate the transfer
of resources abroad; (b) is equivalent to net inflows of direct foreign investment (DFI) less net payments of dividends; (c) is equiva-
lent to net inflows of capital distinct from DFI, less net interest payments; (d) preliminary estimation.
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External debt generates an internal debt, which is not easy to control,
and which is more and more lucrative for banks and for a small section of
the population. Debt servicing also has disastrous consequences for the ma-
jority of the population and especially for the poorer categories, but it is
beneficial to a small minority, as we have just seen.
Being more lucrative, treasury bonds are increasingly preferred to pro-
ductive investment. The apportionment between productive and financial
investment, with the latter becoming increasingly speculative and involving
a relatively limited number of financial products, is inclined to be more and
more in favour of the latter, more profitable in the short term, and more
attractive because of the considerable risk involved in long term financial
commitments when hyperinflation remains at high levels, and even intensi-
fies. With the deterioration of the economic situation and the transition to
higher inflationary levels, the purchase of treasury bonds by firms and the
increasing weight of these purchases in their balance sheet become for some
a means of protecting themselves from the negative fallout of inflation, and
for others, fewer in number, a way of making money themselves through
speculation.6 The investment rate falls, especially in times of open crisis (see
figure 2). This financialization of firms has two consequences. The first in-
volves the rapid obsolescence of production techniques and the difficulty in
facing international competition when borders open and subsidies are re-
duced7 as a result of a fall in investments. The second consequence: the cri-
sis, as well as the transition from high inflation tohyperinflation mentioned
above, encourage speculative investments intreasury bonds, more lucrative
than productive investments. The decline in the rate of investment is, how-
ever, not induced solely by the increasing share of finance. In fact, the rela-
tionship is more complex. Macroeconomic policies adopted by govern-
ments in order to meet as fast as possible the conditions imposed by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and so obtain payment “facilities” for
their external debt, restrict public expenditure and drastically reduce oper-
ating costs, especially investment.8 When the degree of openness of econo-
mies is relatively limited, as was the case with the Latin American econo-
mies in the eighties, the reduction in public expenditure has a recessional
effect on activity levels. In this context and because of it, private investments
decline. The crisis, as well as the transition from high inflation to hyperin-
flation mentioned above, encourage speculative investments in treasury
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bonds, more lucrative than productive investments. Therefore, the switch
from productive investment to financial investment is not directly respon-
sible either for the economic slowdown or for the inflationary crisis, but it’s
the hyperinflationary recession induced by the restrictive public expendi-
ture policy, with the consecutive net transfer of capital overseas, that en-
courage this switch. This emphasizes the recessional effect of this high infla-
tion and the economic depression phase of the economy.
We can therefore understand why the problem of the financial impact
should be examined both at the macroeconomic level and at the firms’ level.
The external debt payments, financed through domestic sources in a closed
economy, generate a profusion of financial products that are themselves re-
sponsible for the considerable growth of the internal debt, more often than
not in the relatively short term. Unlike what happens in developed coun-
tries, the growing importance of finance does not stem so much from the
increasing complexity of the economy, but from the external constraints
which result from the external debt service. In this context, banks no longer
play the role of intermediary vis-à-vis firms, but vis-à-vis the State, by sub-
Source: Diagram drawn from data supplied by Cepal and taken from G. Moguillansky (2003): “Inversion y volatilitad financiera en
America latina”, Revista de la Cepal n. 77. The interesting point of this presentation is that it compares two periods: first, a period
when there is heavy import substitution characterized by a rate of growth and a rate of GFAF both relatively high; then, a second
period with a low rate of growth and a low rate of GFAF. It would probably have been more appropriate to distinguish three peri-
ods by dividing the second into two parts: a period of hyperinflationary management of the debt, and a period of opening up.
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scribing to the highly lucrative securities of its internal debt, and also by of-
fering them to households and firms, rather than making credit available to
firms, which is less lucrative, despite the high and volatile interest rates.
At the macroeconomic level, the swelling profits made by the financial
sector, generated less and less by improvements in the productive base (de-
crease in the rate of investment, rapid obsolescence), are increasingly pro-
duced by a reduction in real wages. In the eighties, capital valorization re-
verted to old methods: it depended on archaic mechanisms of absolute
added value (extended working hours, often by taking on multiple jobs in
order to survive, as a result of the reduction in the purchasing power).9
Value transfers were thus made in an archaic manner, just like in the old
times, when the only way that entrepreneurs could think of extracting sur-
plus gains was by extending working hours or overexploiting workers by
lowering wages. If we assume that the rate of profit is lower than the in-
dexed interest rates paid on treasury bonds issued by the government, we
can be certain that some of the profits realized, instead of being ploughed
back into the business, will be used to buy these bonds. The rate of invest-
ment will decline and future industrial efficiency will therefore be compro-
mised. A vicious cycle is thus set off, which will then be very difficult to
break free of. The decline in industrial efficiency will, however, prompt re-
medial reactions. In this context of financialization, financial profits are not
restored by a more intensive use of new technologies requiring additional
investment, short of transcending the context in question. They can only
come therefore from a reduction in the wage bill through a decrease in real
wages.10 This decrease in income is responsible for extending working
hours, generally in the informal sector. We are thus witnessing a return to, if
not a reinforcement of, the archaic modalities of the exploitation of labour.
A GROWTH REGIME HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON FINANCE
In the nineties, for reasons other than what we have just seen, finance devel-
oped parasitical aspects and was not able to acquire its “virtuous” aspects on
a more permanent basis. These parasitical aspects, however, were not as bad
as they were during the “lost decade” of the eighties. There was very little
increase in the investment rate,11 which was poor when compared to the
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Asian economies. The macroeconomic constraints were “shifted”: other so-
lutions were found for servicing the debt, which had yet other effects on
economic growth, rise in prices and income distribution. Macroeconomic
financial dependence, which is characteristic of growth regimes that are
conceived once inflation ends, gives a boost to the rent-seeking behaviour
of most entrepreneurs: investment rates increase only marginally, and the
economy falls into a “casino logic”. This is what we will try to show.
Before the 1982 crisis (Mexico defaults and the “lost decade” starts in
Latin America), loans came in the form of syndicated credits. The interna-
tional financial system changed in the eighties and developed new financial
products. International bonds, securities and notes got a boost, and credit
lost in importance, with the exception, however, of capital flows headed to-
wards Asian countries.
Except for “involuntary” credits, debt payments in the eighties were fi-
nanced from domestic sources. With the liberalization of their markets,
Latin American countries renewed access to international financial mar-
kets: debt payments were now mainly financed by capital inflows.12 More
specifically, these “voluntary” capital inflows were used initially to finance
the negative trade balance and debt interest. The main part of the amortiza-
tion of the debt principal was financed through “involuntary” bank loans
and direct financing by international institutions. In the first phase, capital
inflows were primarily made up of bond issues, and then, in the second
phase, of direct foreign investment, while the net bond inflows decreased.
In the third phase, the negative trade balance decreased, and then became
positive as a result of devaluations and the adoption of flexible exchange
rates, the initial outcome of the modernization of the production apparatus
being undertaken with the revival of economic growth and the opening of
foreign markets, the slowdown of economic activity, and favorable terms of
trade (rise in the prices of some raw materials).13
TB BCA A
1st phase PIn + DFI PIn + DFI Invol. credits + IMF
2nd phase DFI DFI Invol. credits + IMF
3rd phase TB DFI+ PIn + IMF
NB: TB: trade balance ; BCA: balance on current account ; A: amortization of the principal ; DFI: direct foreign investment ; PIn: net
portfolio investments ; IMF: International Monetary Fund; Cb :“involuntary” credits.
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This millennium began with two significant evolutions: the negative bal-
ance on current account decreased and showed a reverse drift in several
countries — especially in Brazil (and Argentina, with the fall in GDP), which
achieved a highly positive trade balance (except in Mexico, among the ma-
jor countries) —, but direct investment, on the other hand, was cut drasti-
cally. With the conclusion of the stock market crisis in 2002, portfolio in-
vestments also dropped and just about compensated for the repayment of
loans, which represented an additional burden when higher risk premiums
had to be paid. On the whole, the situation was a paradoxical one, with total
financial requirements decreasing in many countries, while the financial ca-
pacity was not always found to meet their needs. Net inflows of capital
(treasury bonds, shares) were, however, not enough to finance the amorti-
zation of both the old external debt (bank credit) and the new one (loans
from international institutions),14 and the chances of toeing the IMF line
were very great.
AN ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN
In the nineties, economic growth picked up again and inflation came down.
At times, the rate of growth was high (Argentina), but mostly it was average,
when compared to the growth between the fifties and seventies, or to that
which took place in Asian countries. Not only was it not high overall, it was
also volatile. This section attempts to show how the growth regime, de-
signed specifically to pull the countries out of the crisis which hit the eight-
ies, was partly responsible for the present drift towards stagnation and,
above all, for its volatility. The latter retroacted negatively on the scale of
growth.
A certain tendency towards stagnation was discernable, but it was not
possible to affirm with any degree of certainty whether or not it would be of
long duration15 (figure 4). This is basically explained by the great disparities
in income. The growth regime established in the eighties, in the wake of the
crisis, reinforced those disparities.16
These staggering inequalities made an acceleration in the rate of gross
capital formation difficult, with the latter “stagnating” at a lower level when
compared with the Asian economies, where the disparities were not so
marked. This acute disparity enabled approximately 30% of the population
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to achieve income levels more or less equivalent to those reached by the cor-
responding sections of society in the developed countries. It induced rent-
seeking behaviour. Indeed, the average income of the population was much
lower than in the developed countries. The income level of 30-35% of the
population was, however, comparable to that of the developed countries.
The disparity between their average income compared to the remaining
65% of the population was thus mathematically much more marked than in
the developed countries. This difference explains the difficulty experienced
by many durable goods, such as cars, to “proletarianize”, as their supply was
not matched by a solvent demand from this segment of the population, in
contrast to what is commonly observed in developed countries. It also ex-
plains why, when the market is limited both in absolute as well as in relative
terms in relation to the dimensional constraints of supply, the growth ex-
pectancy for this type of product is limited, and also why we are likely to
witness the paradox of a satisfactory capital valorization with little reinvest-
Table 1. Evolution of the rate of growth of GDP in the principal countries (in 1995 dollars)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Latin America
and the Caribeean 3.4 –0.6 2.1 3.4 0.6 –1.1 2.1 –1.1 –1.9 0.0
Subtotal (20 countries) 3.4 –0.6 2.1 3.4 0.6 –1.1 2.1 –1.1 –1.9 0.0
Argentina 4.4 –4.1 4.1 6.6 2.5 –4.6 –2.1 –5.6 –11.9 6.0
Bolivia 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.5 –2.1 –0.1 –0.7 0.4 0.2
Brazil 4.7 2.7 1.0 1.6 –1.2 –0.4 2.6 2.0 0.6 –1.2
Chile 3.3 7.2 5.3 5.2 1.9 –1.8 2.8 1.9 0.8 2.0
Colombia 3.9 2.9 0.0 1.4 –1.2 –5.6 0.5 –0.4 –0.1 1.6
Costa Rica 2.1 1.4 –1.6 2.8 5.6 5.3 –0.6 –1.0 0.7 3.5
Cuba –0.1 2.0 8.6 2.9 –0.5 5.3 5.9 2.5 0.9 2.3
Ecuador 1.4 –0.1 0.9 3.1 0.1 –7.6 –1.0 3.5 1.9 0.2
El Salvador 3.7 4.0 –0.4 2.1 1.6 1.3 0.0 –0.2 0.2 0.1
Guatemala 1.4 2.2 0.3 1.7 2.4 1.1 0.7 0.0 –0.5 –0.2
Haiti –19.1 7.5 3.7 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.2 –2.4 –2.3 –1.1
Honduras –4.8 0.7 0.7 2.0 0.4 –4.1 2.8 0.0 –0.2 0.4
Mexico 2.5 –7.8 3.6 5.0 3.4 1.9 5.0 –1.8 –0.7 –0.3
Nicaragua 0.3 2.9 3.5 1.1 0.3 4.0 1.6 0.4 –1.9 –0.4
Panama 1.0 –0.1 0.6 2.6 2.6 1.5 0.6 –1.5 –1.1 1.1
Paraguay 0.3 1.7 –1.6 –0.3 –3.2 –2.6 –3.2 –0.2 –4.9 0.0
Peru 10.7 6.7 0.7 5.0 –2.3 –0.8 1.0 –1.4 3.2 2.4
Dominican Republic 2.9 2.5 5.3 6.3 5.6 6.2 5.5 1.3 2.6 –2.9
Uruguay 6.2 –3.0 4.2 4.6 3.6 –4.1 –2.6 –4.2 –11.4 0.3
Venezuela –5.2 2.6 –2.1 4.6 –1.5 –7.4 1.7 1.5 –10.7 –11.2
Source: Cepal: “Balance preliminar de las economias de America Latina y Caraibes”, 2003.
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ment, as capital is more inclined to move out of the sector or out of the
country, since the expansion prospects of this market segment are not very
promising.17
The predominantly financial growth regime set up in the nineties
brought about further modifications in the income structure. To be precise,
the level of inequality remained more or less stable at the higher levels, but a
bipolarity was discernable. The income of the top 5% to 10% in the well-off
segment increased in relation to total income. The income of the next 30%
was characterized by a decline: those in the upper income bracket evolved
on the same lines as the top 10%, but at a slower pace, while the rest under-
went a process of relative impoverishment. A mechanism similar to the one
taking place in the U.S. thus occurred: the middle class became less impor-
tant, and society as a whole began to resemble that of the early 20th century.
Krugman reminds us that Gatsby, the hero of Fitzgerald’s novel, moved in
this society, where a whole host of domestic jobs could be found in the
homes of 5% to 10% of the moneyed elite. This “come back” signaled a no-
table social regression.18 It is therefore logical that the structure of spending
was affected. In particular, the ostentatious spending by the upper classes,
as well as the “redistribution” of income through growing domestic em-
ployment, were not of a nature to revitalise sectorial supply and hence a
valorization of capital, except in the construction sector. It is true that the
upper classes are likely to save more than the middle and lower classes, but a
large part of their savings are secured in funds that are not used for invest-
ment. In fact, savings serve mainly to buy particularly lucrative treasury
bonds issued by the government to service its internal debt, now a major
budget item. When those savings are deposited in the banks, they do not
provide capital to be used for investment, or produce very little: the interest
rate are too high to encourage entrepreneurs and households to borrow,
and the deposited savings go towards the State’s liquidity requirements to
finance its debt, with very little going towards investment.
As long as this inequality is not counterbalanced by decisive intervention
in the economic sphere  on the part of the State (active industrial policy), it
is certain that the factors nurturing the tendency towards stagnation will
continue to prevail. In line with this, the stagnation thesis of the sixties and
seventies remains relevant for the most part, and can be used as the basis for
developing a new theory of stagnation.
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Source: Indec, according to A. Saludjian, op. cit.
(b) This growth was volatile. Growth was punctuated by financial crises.
Volatility was nevertheless less consequential than in the eighties.19 It was
however substantial enough, as we can see in figure 3. It was more impor-
tant in some countries (Argentina) than in others (Brazil, for example), as
figure 4 illustrates.
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Figure 3: Interannual variation ratio of quarterly GDP of Latin American economies,
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Not only are reversals of the economic situation frequent,20 but in gen-
eral they are particularly marked, so that changes in the GDP profile are
more representative of the European 19th century cycles, with their absolute
peaks and troughs, than of the 20th century cycles, with their accelerations
and decelerations. This latter characteristic, more than the mediocre
growth, explains the particularly great vulnerability of the poor.21 In other
words, for an equivalent average rate of growth in the long duration, the
vulnerability is greater when volatility is high than when it is low. The dete-
rioration in the standard of living is inversely proportional to the level of
wealth (Hicks and Wodon, 2001) and, for the poorest, it remains out of
sync with the cycle, when growth picks up again as a result of hysteresis
(B. Lautier et alli, 2003, op. cit., N. Lustig, 2000, op. cit.).
The impact of the sudden opening up of capital markets on the real
economy is extremely violent when a financial crisis is brewing. To prevent
the flight of capital, interest rates have to be raised to astronomical levels,
which very quickly, unless capital outflows are slowed down, paralyses pro-
duction and triggers an economic crisis. Economists have found that the ra-
pidity of reaction of the real economy is much slower than that of the finan-
cial economy.22 An increase in the investment rate, for example, has a
positive effect on growth only after a certain time. Even a consequential de-
preciation of the national currency, in the wake of speculative activity,
boosts exports only after a certain length of time; even so, it must also be of
a certain magnitude, when the economy is not a very open one and the
goods exported are not primarily raw materials, if the goal is to achieve a
positive trade balance. Reaction to these policies is thus not very swift. In
contrast, the financial sector is very sensitive to speculation, resulting in the
sudden flight of large sums of money from the country. This exacerbated
sensitivity has considerable repercussions and leverage on the real sector.
Let us look at some examples: a considerable increase in interest rates (they
went up to 50% in Brazil at the height of the speculative offensives in 1998)
— designed to check the ensuing capital outflows and reverse the process
—, initially makes credit extremely expensive, inflates the State’s internal
debt, consequently making deficit reduction even more difficult, and lastly,
very quickly, triggers a recession or deepens the crisis in the real sector. We
are thus witnessing what is called the “overshooting” of the financial sector
over the real sector.
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This difference in sensitivity is inversely proportional to the degree of
openness of the economy. In Latin America, the economies remain rela-
tively closed, despite a progressive opening up in the last ten years.23 In con-
sequence, one of the more important ratios to be considered is not the
external debt/GDP ratio, but the debt/value of exports ratio. In Latin Amer-
ican countries, the latter ratio is very high (see figure 5).
The capacity of the growth regime set up in the nineties to produce fi-
nancial crises was remarkable. Its financing requirements were consider-
able. The financial side (interests and dividends, amortization) was not eas-
ily controlled, except by a significant and sustainable increase in exports
resulting in a significantly higher positive balance of trade. The financial ca-
pacity depended on several factors, some of which continued to generate
pernicious effects (liberalization of the financial markets and high interest
rates policies), while others proved difficult to control by the governments
of those countries (financial possibilities of the developed countries de-
pending on the circumstances). We can therefore understand that the ques-
tion of the credibility of government policies is not situated at the absolute,
but at the relative level. For example, an important reduction in the finan-
cial capacities, even though the financial requirements may be fewer, is
enough for the gap between capacities and requirements to reach a critical
size, thereby promoting speculation, driving up interest rates, triggering a
financial crisis followed by a currency depreciation and a slowdown of
growth. This drop in capacity can be greater than the reduction in financial
requirements, and so precipitate a crisis, especially if the arrival of a new
government to power raises doubts in the financial markets as to the current
regime’s continuation of the previous government’s economic policy.24
These growth regimes are greatly dependent on finance. The key variable
of adjustment is the interest rate,25 and this to the detriment of growth
when the net inflow of capital is inadequate. As Belluzo et alli (op. cit.)
points out, the impact of financial speculation is rapidly reflected on the ex-
change rate. We can thus observe an uneven evolution of the exchange rate:
when the governments’ economic policies acquire a certain credibility, and
when the financing power is not limited by a crisis in the developed coun-
tries, the real exchange rate is likely to rise against the dollar, even when the
nominal exchange rate is relatively fixed (either totally fixed, or fluctuating
23Pierre Salama — Latin America: rethinking financial dependency




















| | | | | |
0 100 200 300 400 500




















| | | | | |





24  R. Econ. contemp., Rio de Janeiro, 9(1): 7-40, jan./abr. 2005
within a band). This appreciation is conducive to the repatriation of divi-
dends and profits generated by the boom in direct foreign investment.
When the financing requirements increase considerably, including when
the balance of trade position improves — because of a considerable hike in
the interest on the debt, in the reimbursement of the principal but also in
the dividends (in keeping with the growth of the foreign investment stock),
and in the inadequacy of some capital inflows (decline in direct foreign and
portfolio investments) —, markets can lose confidence. The aim of the hike
in interest rates is to check market apprehensions, or even to reverse the
trend. But as we have seen, this rise must be all the more important, since
the finance sector grows at a faster pace than the real sector, and also be-
cause the economy is not a very open one and has a high debt /exports ratio.
The sudden rise in interest rates can trigger a crisis, rendering not only ser-
vicing the internal debt more onerous, but also making it more difficult to
respond positively to the demands of the international financial markets,
except by drastically cutting public expenditure, other than the expenditure
on debt servicing. The failure of such a policy results in a massive devalua-
tion — when the exchange rate is a fixed one —, and in a significant depre-
ciation — in the case of a flexible exchange rate regime.26 This also makes it
easier to achieve a positive trade balance, helped moreover by the decline in
imports due to the crisis. But, it is basically the accompanying measures
that, in general, are useful27 in regaining creditworthiness with interna-
tional institutions and in shaking off the financial crisis.28 The paradox is
surprising: on the one hand, economic policies bring on the crisis instead of
preventing it,29 and on the other, they are often the “mandatory passage”
for regaining the support of international organizations, and through them,
that of international financial markets. We can thus understand why it is
often countries whose efforts have been lauded by these organizations that
are more likely to experience a crisis...
THE EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL BOOM ON LABOUR MANAGEMENT
Our thesis is that the autonomy of the financial markets is in fact only su-
perficial. The source of the gains obtained by few is partially explained by
the loss sustained by others. There can be winners or losers at an absolute or
25Pierre Salama — Latin America: rethinking financial dependency
at a relative level. In the former case, finance engenders pernicious effects
and the growth regime is caught in a vicious cycle. This is our analysis for
the eighties. In the latter case, the losers gain in absolute terms but lose in
relative terms to the winners. Here, the growth regime enters into a virtuous
cycle. This is what happened in the United States during Clinton’s presi-
dency. The Latin American economies are somewhere in the middle, but
closer to the vicious cycle than to the virtuous one, with two special features
that distinguish them from developed countries: financial products and
currency. The financial products are mainly issued by the government in
order to provide for the budget deficit and obtain funds for servicing the
internal and external debts. Few financial products are issued by firms,
whether bonds or shares. Their money is not a key currency, and the reim-
bursement of loans is linked to their capacity to obtain hard currencies.
Consequently, we can draw a simple conclusion: financial dependence is,
first of all, the concern of States, and secondly, of firms. Thus, we cannot
take a Minsky-type argument,29 generally used in the context of firms, and
apply it to economic policies in order to explain the working of the “casino
effect” which characterizes them. The fact that governments are induced to
look for Ponzi-type finances does not have the same signification nor the
same consequences as it would in the case of firms. To be more precise,
firms are dependent on the environment within which they operate. This
environment is marked by profound disparities in income (not very condu-
cive to revitalizing growth), by limited openness, by less State intervention
in the economy — as compared to what it was in the fifties through the sev-
enties —, by integration in the world economy (based principally on the
greater role of market forces), by considerable financial dependence and,
lastly, by a growth regime that has taken several features from the “casino
economy” (very severe external constraints due to the divorce between fi-
nancing requirements and capacity). This external constraint has an im-
moderate influence on the government’s interest rates policy and the search
for a substantial primary budget surplus. High interest rates deter firms
from resorting to the banking system for financing their investments, and
motivate them to purchase government treasury bonds. The decision to go
for financial investment in lieu of productive investment thus constitutes an
additional factor of poor growth.
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Productive investment has its limitations and, unless the entrepreneur
accepts the idea of disappearing abruptly from the market, with all the irre-
coverable costs that this would imply, he cannot put all his profits into fi-
nancial products under the pretext that they are more profitable than invest-
ment in the principal activity. However, the profit differential leads firms to
invest more than in the past in these products and to invest less in the prin-
cipal activity and, in so doing, give greater importance to finance. Similarly,
affluent households put their money into lucrative financial products. The
specificity of the Latin American example is that these financial products are
made of treasury bonds. Banks encourage this trend by subscribing to these
bonds and placing them. They are less keen to grant credit to firms to fi-
nance their investments than to put their money into securities, unless they
are compelled to do so (statutory reserves). High interest rates do not en-
courage firms to borrow in order to invest, and they do so mainly from their
equity capital.31 The larger firms, of course, have access to international fi-
nancial markets, either directly or through the parent company.
The financialization of firms takes place to the detriment of investment,
that is, indirectly to the detriment of employment and/or wages. In other
words, the financial surpluses invested in financial products are really the
result of an arbitrary decision detrimental to investment in comparison to
financial products, rather than the result of a profitability analysis of the lat-
ter, considered inadequate. This is what in fact explains that, all things being
equal, the financial profits derived from this new activity do not revert, or
not much, to investments in the principal activity. Conversely, the only
thing needed would be a modification of the competition conditions, an in-
crease in investment profitability — due to an increase in effective demand
resulting from changes in the macroeconomic environment —, or a drop in
financial profitability, for financial profits to be partly used for investment.
 In the medium and long term, this “breeding ground” function of in-
vestment is, however, not central, and the financialization of firms tends to
occur in Latin American economies.
The rent-seeking behaviour of Latin American investors, which we have
already highlighted, impacts upon labour management, hampering evolu-
tion of real wages and productivity of labour, enhancing flexibility and job
insecurity, lowering productive employment, increasing the use of casual
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labour in relation to total employment. We assume that the source of returns
is in labour. Because it feeds on labour, the development of financial activi-
ties impacts upon employment, upon wages, and upon the forms of domi-
nation in the workplace.
The new forms of domination in the workplace are the result of several
technological, social and financial constraints. Let us review them. The
modernization of the productive apparatus occurs as a result of the opening
up of these economies and of the large-scale introduction of sophisticated
equipment goods.32 It induces significant changes in the organization of
work, except that there are degrees of liberty in the choice of this organi-
zation. In fact, it is not uncommon that, within the same technological
group, there can be different modes of organization of work in the various
subsidiaries of a multinational firm producing the same good, but situated
in different countries (Humphrey, ed. 1995).33 The nature of the manufac-
tured products also impacts upon the organization of work and the search
for “functional” (or qualitative) flexibility, aiming at a greater adaptability
of labour. We know that, once the middle class has reached a certain level of
purchasing power in these countries, demand changes and diversified prod-
ucts are generally preferred to standardized products.34 The relationship
between demand and supply is thereafter situated more towards the lower
end than the upper end of the chain. The diversification of demand, the
emphasis on quality, leads to a rethinking about stocks and delivery sched-
ules. The organization of production changes: just-in-time processes are
applied and stocks are cut down. Work organization now is likely to change
radically: prescribed work is reduced and team work is stressed, together
with the use of multiskilled jobs. There is job insecurity, annualized work,
intensification and skill increase, to the detriment of qualifications.
To these factors contributing to the imposition of new forms of domina-
tion in the workplace, one should add the inadequate investment in the Latin
American economies, on the one hand, and the effect of liberalization of for-
eign trade, along with the withdrawal of the State, on the other. When the vol-
ume of investment grows insufficiently, altering its form becomes urgent.
So, idle time is reduced, and work is intensified, reorganized and annual-
ized. For similar reasons, the lowering of labour costs is sought through a
28  R. Econ. contemp., Rio de Janeiro, 9(1): 7-40, jan./abr. 2005
policy of wage “moderation” and increased mobility of labour, thanks to
greater job insecurity (by resorting to the use of casual labour and by mak-
ing redundancies easier). The externalization of a number of activities, con-
sidered insufficiently profitable for the firm, makes it possible to consider-
ably modify working, employment and work organization conditions in the
context of activities that are not the direct responsibility of these firms. The
hiring or rehiring of workers by subcontractors, who earlier would have
found jobs in the large firms, is done under very different conditions.
Externalization is thus a means of imposing labour flexibility, by especially
laying stress on wages, annualization of the work schedule, easier layoff
terms, the nonrecognition of qualifications in favour of underpaid skills,
and work reorganization, depending on the circumstances.
Generally speaking, the real improvement in the productivity of labour
in Latin America, since it came out of the inflationary cycle, can be ex-
plained partly by the different modes of domination in the workplace, and
partly by the installation of new equipment. The particularity here is that,
since the rate of investment increased more slowly than in the eighties, work
organization played a greater part in the productivity increase. In an envi-
ronment of acute competition, the reduction in the unitary cost of labour,
for want of sufficient investment, forcibly meant the search for greater flex-
ibility of the work force, without the latter being necessarily linked to the
nature of the technologies used. And, as insufficient investment is partly ex-
plained by the importance given to financial activities, the greater weight of
finance in the firms’ balance sheet today, compared to the past, gives more
weight to the search for greater labour flexibility.
CONCLUSION
The effects of debt servicing and financial development are not the same in
the two periods under consideration. In the former period, the purchasing
power of a majority of the population was reduced in absolute terms. In the
latter, the changes in the purchasing power and labour productivity were
perceptibly de-linked. In both cases, the negative aspects of financial devel-
opment prevailed over the positive aspects, but more so in the first than in
the second period.
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Today, the “balancing” of the inflows and outflows of the balance of pay-
ments is done by adjusting interest rates, the key variable of economic poli-
cies. The hike in interest rates, not to say maintaining them at relatively high
levels, a necessary but not sufficient condition to attract capital when the
latter is in short supply, on the one hand makes banks more vulnerable by
lowering the value of their assets, in turn inciting them to offer junk loans,
and also by increasing the risk of debtors defaulting on payments; on the
other hand, it raises the cost of borrowing considerably, thereby weakening
the position of the states vis-à-vis the federal State, and adds to the budget
deficit, which cannot be contained merely by reducing public expenditure.
It also leads to a reduction in the investment projects of firms for two rea-
sons: one linked to cost, the other to the possibility of purchasing treasury
bonds, more profitable than investment. The recessive effect of the hike in
interest rates creates a vicious cycle: any hike of this rate aggravates budget-
ary difficulties, brings about a recession, leads to a new hike in the interest
rates and to a devaluation/depreciation of the exchange rate. This self-sus-
tained movement becomes very difficult to stop, and its effects in terms of
social vulnerability are considerable.
The paradox in the situation of numerous countries today is that the
situation, on the one hand, can improve, and on the other, worsen: not only
would there be a slowdown of growth, but above all it could become highly
volatile, there would be an acute social vulnerability and the impossibility
under this growth regime to obtain any significant reduction in the wide-
spread poverty. The financial logic underlying the functioning of a “casino
economy” produces great instability in the economic activity, making it dif-
ficult to prevent financial crises or — and the two are connected —, as a
consequence of the eruption of the crises. The financial logic of these modes
of insertion in the global economy gives a growth profile similar to a roller
coaster. Eventually, this type of growth is poised on a “razor’s edge”.
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APPENDIX
A moderate growth of sophisticated
industrial exports
Compared to emerging Asian economies, the growth rate of sophisticated
industrial exports is moderate. This can be explained by the low rate of
gross fixed asset formation, by the powerful rise in foreign investment
(which is increasingly directed towards the service industry), by poor efforts
in the R & D sector, and by the lack of sophistication of the goods exported,
even today. Let us briefly take up these factors one by one. The rate of gross
fixed asset formation, which is two or three points higher than what it was
in the eighties, remains moderate, and is approximately three-fifths of that
of the main South East Asian countries. Foreign investment has grown im-
mensely in the last decade, to the extent that, for a country like Brazil, the
share of international capital on the production side is nearly twice that of
the United States. Foreign firms, equal in size to the domestic firms, are ex-
porting more than the latter in the manufacturing sector. They also import
more. Apart from Mexico — where a large portion of direct foreign invest-
ment, approximately half, makes its way mainly to the assembled goods in-
dustry (maquilladoras) —, direct investment, more so than in the past, is
finding its way into the service industry, a sector that does not export but
rather imports.35 The degree of sophistication of exported industrial goods
continues to be rather poor, despite indubitable progress. If we divide the
exported goods into four categories, according to their degree of growth —
very dynamic, dynamic, not very dynamic and stationary —, the figures for
the growth in international trade from 1990 to 1998 are: 186% for the first
category, where we find a concentration of high-tech goods (computers,
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals etc., but also other less sophisticated
goods such as textiles for home furnishings), 96% for the second, and 67%
and 49% respectively for the last two. When we compare the exports of this
group of goods with their international growth, we find that the diagnosis
on Latin America as a whole is disturbing: exports by Latin Americans to
Latin American countries fell by 8% compared with international trade to
the region, in the case of the most dynamic goods category; exports by Latin
American countries to industrialized countries increased by 93% compared
with the growth of international trade in this category of goods to this re-
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gion. This increase is explained essentially by the very high share of as-
sembled goods industries in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and
Mexico; in Brazil, where this type of industry is not frequently encountered,
the figures are eloquent: –12% and –79% for goods in the first category,
with this loss of “market share” taking place in the most industrialized
country in Latin America (Benavente, 2002).36 These results match those
obtained by Unctad (2002).37 When we consider 20 of the most dynamic
products exported from 1980 to 1998, we see that the share of exports by
developing countries in the global trade increased from 14.1% to 28.7%,
which seems positive. This impression is confirmed when we note that, out
of the 20 products most exported by this group of countries, eight belong to
the 20 most dynamic products at the global level (the ratio is fifteen out of
20 for the industrialized countries). But when we analyse these figures by
groups of countries, we find different results: the South American econo-
mies (which, by definition, exclude Mexico and Central America) only ex-
port two out of the 20 products: soft drinks and accessories — computers
and electronic equipment being exported mostly by Asian economies. This
diagnosis is even more severe when we take a closer look at the Mexican ex-
ample. Products are defined on the basis of a three digit classification, so
that goods that are classified as “high-tech, necessitating highly qualified
labour” — such as computers, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals etc.
—, and which are characterized by an export boom in developing countries,
are in fact mostly goods assembled in factories. Specifically, it concerns the
labour intensive segments of the production lines of high-tech products, of
which a more detailed breakdown would have given a clearer picture. Many
high-tech goods are not so in reality — this deceptive aspect is due to the
lack of precision in the classification. This applies to Mexico (with the ex-
ception of the automotive industry) and most of the Asian countries. Ex-
cept for South Korea, these countries chose this type of specialization, with-
out opting for an industrial policy that seeks to integrate, within the
national economy, the delocalized segments of multinational firms of the
industrialized countries (Jomo, 2001).38 Consequently, the value added lo-
cally is very little. They have, moreover, neglected the research and develop-
ment aspect by not developing, or by doing so only negligibly, special high-
tech zones.
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On the whole, Latin American exports have increased on the same lines
as the general movement of global trade: on average, global trade grows
more quickly than the GDP worldwide. This is the result of the modernizat-
ion of most Latin American economies, but it is also indicative of the accu-
mulation of decades of backwardness and, a contrario, of the need for a se-
lective industrial policy, which is the only thing capable of giving sufficient
impetus to this movement, an impetus all the more necessary as financial
dependence increased in the nineties. Achieving a more substantial and sus-
tainable positive balance of trade — outside recessive phases — might re-
duce financial vulnerability and, in so doing, check the pernicious effects on
the poorer categories of the population.
The breakdown of certain capital inflows, classified according to their
specification (bonds, credits), is useful for analysing the modification of
some external constraints and the margin of manoeuvre of governments.
The following diagram shows, for Brazil, the evolution of the ratios “inflows
less reimbursement of amortization”, according to the different types of
capital inflows. When this ratio exceeds a hundred, there are more inflows
than outflows, and vice-versa for a particular type of financial product. The
debt generated by this financial product increases. If the ratio is lower than a
hundred, it decreases for this product. These ratios can also be interpreted
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in another manner and express tensions and difficulties in obtaining capital
inflows under a particular form (bonds, notes, credits) corresponding to
the financing requirements. When these requirements have been stabilized,
but the ratio falls, this evolution can indicate tensions, a decline in the re-
serves and a rise in the spreads on the interest rate.
NOTES
1. Firms in developing countries finance 70% of their assets through self-financing, 20%
through loans, and 10% through share issues. In Latin America, in the nineties, these
figures were respectively 80% for self-financing and 20% for the rest, according to
Bebczuk of the CEF, who adds: “(...) developed economies have a credit stock approxi-
mately equivalent to 110% of the GDP: in Argentina, during the Currency Board period,
it was 34%, and in 2003, a little under 10%.”
2. To briefly recapitulate, a firm is driven into a Ponzi-type situation when its anticipated
profits encourage it to borrow excessively. Here, it is banking upon the previous
period’s cash flow to reimburse (interest plus capital). When the expected profits are
not realized due to overoptimism and when, in addition, the interest rates increases to
check additional investment, the cash flow becomes insufficient. The firm’s financial
structure causes an imbalance and a financial crisis erupts. For an application of Myns-
ki’s theory on Latin American countries, see Kremer G. (1988): “Le modèle d’instabilité
financière de Minsky”, document from Greitd, mimeo, Paris.
3. As opposed to what we thought in 1996 in: “La financiarisation excluante, les leçons des
economies latino americaines”, in F. Chesnais (ed.) (1996): La Mondialisation Finan-
cière, Genèse; Coût et Enjeux, Ed. Syros, Paris, but in conformity with our study under-
taken in 2000. See Salama P. (2000): “Du productif au financier et du financier au
productif en Asie et en Amerique Latine”, Conseil d’Analyse économique, La Docu-
mentation française, n. 25, published in Portuguese (2001) in: Revista da Sociedade
Brasileira de Economia Política.
4. Very often analyses that are either Marxist in inspiration, or adopt a Marxian approach,
have a tendency to dwell upon the cost factor alone. See, for example, Argitis G. (2003):
“Finance, Instability Crisis: The Marx, Keynes and Minsky Problems in Contemporary
Capitalism”, mimeo, University of Cambridge. But they forget that Marx analysed capi-
tal accumulation in terms of a cycle, namely the productive capital cycle.
5. We could add that the negative net transfer is equivalent to excess saving, but the excess
does not help to finance investment because it services the debt. A corollary of this ex-
cess saving is less consumption and, therefore, a fall in effective demand. According to
the Keynesian interpretation, one could say that this reduced effective demand has
negative effects on the estimations made by entrepreneurs, so that there is a decrease in
investments.
6. “Remember Keynes’s evocative representation: the problem of financing is to ensure
mobilization of real resources. A good financial system will facilitate the transformation
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of stone into bread. Today, we are suffering from a financial fixation which could well
transform bread into stone”, reminds H. W. Singer, former director of the World Bank,
in an interview given to the journal Alternatives économiques (February 1994).
7. This liability partly explains the importance of the destruction of capital in the wake of
the open border policy in Mexico and Argentina, and the importance, but also the sud-
denness, of the trade gap.
8. The increase in public expenditure is mainly explained by the rapid rise in the internal
debt and external public debt servicing.
9. I have expanded upon this mechanism in: “La financiarisation excluante, les leçons des
économies latino américaines” in F. Chesnais (ed.) (1996), op. cit.
10. In the large firms, some index-linking to prices does occur. Even in this case, which is an
advantage — when compared with the situation of workers who do not benefit at all, or
only nominally —, the real wage is reduced by half the difference between the peak and
the trough salaries, calculated during the nonindexed period, except if indexing is auto-
matic (which does not happen). In the case of financial products, indexing is not ex post
but ex ante, and the opposite mechanism to that of wages can then be seen. The bibliog-
raphy on this subject is considerable, often of Kaleckian inspiration. We can refer to
J. Ros (1993) (ed.): La Edad de Plomo del Desarollo Latino American, Fondo de Cultura
Economica (Mexico), and, for a presentation of these analyses, to our book written
jointly with J. Valier (1994): Pauvreté et Inégalités dans le Tiers Monde: la découverte
(France, translated into Spanish and Portuguese), or to our book: Riqueza y pobreza en
America Latina (1999), Fondo de Cultura Economica (Mexico).
11. In Brazil, during the period 1990-2002, on an average, this rate was slightly lower when
compared to the eighties, and much lower than in the seventies, when calculated on the
basis of the 1980 price index. However, the lowering of import duties — with the open-
ing up of the economy and the purchase of equipment abroad (mostly state of the art
technology) —, replacing locally produced goods incorporating older technologies,
gave to investment a capital saving aspect (in the sense defined by Joan Robinson, that is
a decline in the value of capital goods in relation to consumer goods). We can evaluate
this effect to approximately two points of the GDP, so that we can consider that the rate
of gross formation of the previous period is underestimated to two points, when we cal-
culate it on the basis of the 1980 prices.
12. To recapitulate briefly: S – I = Y – A = X – M, where S corresponds to private saving, I to
investment, C to consumption, G to public expenditure, Y to national income, A to ab-
sorption (or C + I + G), X to exports and M to imports.
If T is public expenditure, we get: Y – T = C + I + (G – T) + (X – M)
S being private saving, we get S = Y – C – T, from which we obtain the basic account-
ing identity : X – X = (S – I) + (T – G)
The deficit (or surplus) of the trade balance corresponds to deficits (or surpluses) of
net private and public saving. It pertains to an accounting identity. The liberal current
interprets it as an economic relation, and deduces that the trade balance deficit, the
source of debt, is the result of excess consumption, both private and public, that should
be curbed. The opening up of the economy should enable a better allocation of re-
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sources and an international specialization in conformity with factorial allocations; the
budget surplus should make it easier to service the public debt, the excess of private sav-
ing over investment the servicing of the private debt. The inflow of capital should help
to minimize this effort and also help financially to service the debt. We realize that, ac-
cording to this approach, the recommended economic policy should be one of open
markets, including that of capital, liberalization of markets and the end of financial re-
pression (hence a rise in interest rates), and primary budget surplus. This approach is
different from that proposed by the Keynesians, who give more importance to supply:
an increase in investment (the deficit is permitted for a certain period) should lead to an
increase in income and, consequently, saving; currency ranking — the currency of
emerging countries — does not weigh much in the balance when compared to the dol-
lar. We have seen (cf. infra) that this gives rise to a series of particularly pernicious
mechanisms, since the State has to buy the currencies that it needs: high interest rates,
an extremely onerous internal debt, and a cutting down of other expenditures, the
strictness of which depends on IMF stipulations with regard to the primary budget
surplus.
13. The opening up of these economies led to a restructuring of the industrial fabric and the
relativizing of industry in relation to other sources of wealth, such as agriculture or raw
materials. The industrial fabric was restructured when capital goods incorporating new
technologies were imported. They had become less expensive as a result of the liberal-
ization of external trade and the appreciation of the currencies, although there was peri-
odic currency depreciation during the financial crises. These imports — combined with
a new organization of work and greater flexibility of labour — facilitated, outside the
periods of economic crisis, the sustained growth of labour productivity, which was itself
responsible for the increase in exports. In some countries, this process had further im-
plications: entire segments of the industrial apparatus vanished, and the growth of ex-
ports was the result of the greater specialization of primary agricultural and mining
products. Two examples of this were Argentina and Chile. In other countries, such as
Mexico and several Central American States, foreign investment increased in order to
produce for the domestic market (Mexico), or production was meant for external mar-
kets, with very little national value added (Mexico, Central America). See Lautier B. et
alli, 2003.
14. We concur with J. Kregel’s analysis (2003): “The Perils of Globalization: Structural, Cy-
clical and Systemic Causes of Unemployment”, working paper.
15. We have tried to theorize this process in an article written in honour of Celso Furtado:
“La tendance à la stagnation revisitée” (2003), mimeo, to be published.
16. We have analysed the causes of the growing disparities in Salama P. (2002): “La
pauvreté prise dans les turbulences macroéconomiques en Amérique latine”, Problèmes
d’Amérique latine, n. 45, La documentation française, Paris, published in Portuguese
(2002) in: Revista da Sociedade Brasileira de Economia Política.
17. The Argentina of the nineties illustrates this type of behaviour: enhanced valorization
of capital in the large enterprises, with substantial repatriation of capital until the Cur-
rency Board was finally shelved.
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18. The only difference, however, is that the level of inequality in which the process took
place in Latin America was much greater in comparison to the United States: in 1998,
according to the BID, the Gini coefficient applicable to 100% of the population of the
United States was 0.38, and that of 90% of the not so well-off population was 0.35. The
ratio of the two Gini cofficients was thus not very high. This does not apply to Chile, a
small country which is an extreme example in Latin America: the figures are respectively
0.58 and 0.27. For the record, the Gini for Brazil, a big country, according to the BID, is
close to 0.6 for the total population and 0.44 for 90% of the population. The difference
between the 90%/100% ratios of these countries and the United States is thus signifi-
cant.
19. The more recent body of literature on this subject is now becoming extensive. Apart
from A. Saludjian’s thesis (2003), let us mention the IPES-IADB document (2004): Good
Jobs Wanted: labor market in Latin America; D. Rodrik (2001): “Por que hay tanta
insecuridad economica en America Latina”, Revista de la Cepal n. 73, Chile; N. Lustig
(2000): “Crisis and the Poor; Socially Responsible Macroeconomics”; Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB), Technical Papers Series, Washington; G. Moguillansky
(2003): “Inversion y volatilitad financiera en America Latina”, Revista de la Cepal n. 77.
20. The initial crisis occurred in the mid-nineties. Mexico’s trade deficit grew to such an ex-
tent (–20 billion dollars in 1994) that foreign investors began to have doubts about the
Mexican government’s capacity to meet all its obligations. Fearing a devaluation, na-
tional and foreign capital fled the country. The currency was devalued twice. The
American government offered a massive aid package to the Mexican government in or-
der to cope with the withdrawal of huge sums of money. This was a new type of crisis:
it was the first manifestation of the effects of the sudden and massive liberalization of
these economies. It created conditions favouring the outflow of capital in other fragile
countries such as Argentina (tequila effect).
21. B. Lautier, J. Marques Pereira, P. Salama (2003): Régime de croissance, vulnérabilité et
protection sociale en Amérique Latine. Les conditions macro de l’efficacité de la lutte
contre la pauvreté. Cepal, série financiamento del desarollo, n. 140.
22. To some extent, we find the same assessment in Calvo G., Izquierdo A. and Talvi E.
(2002): “Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina’s
Lessons”, Inter-American Development Bank, working paper. Calvo designates the not
so open, indebted and de facto dollarized (CDM) economies as economies that are par-
ticularly sensitive to capital movements, especially if the home banks have little interac-
tion with foreign banks, and if the public debt is significant. The introduction of a flex-
ible exchange rate could play a certain role (although this will depend on the quality of
the country’s institutions) if these characteristics (CDM) are tempered (greater open-
ness, less debt and dollarization). The skepticism about the effectiveness of an exchange
rate policy — when the quality of institutions has not improved at the fiscal, financial
and currency levels — has been developed in Calvo G. and Mishkin F. (2003}: “The Mi-
rage of Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Market Countries”, NBER, working paper.
23. In fifteen years (from 1985 to 2000), the value of exports increased five times in Mexico,
three times in Argentina and doubled in Brazil. For reasons already indicated (see box),
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we can say that Brazil and Argentina remained relatively closed economies despite a sus-
tained effort at opening up, and that Mexico is now an open economy. This assessment
needs to be qualified: Mexico, no doubt, has opened up considerably in comparison to
other economies, but a not negligible part of its export boom (and imports) is due to the
development of maquilladoras, for which the rate of integration varies between 2% and
5%, depending on the sectors. We are in a scenario which is the complete opposite of
that found in most emerging Asian economies, where their greater integration is the re-
sult of industrial policies. In Mexico, the greater openness has some “artificial” aspects
and leaves the economy extremely vulnerable to the conditions prevailing in the neigh-
bouring countries (see P. Mejia Reyes, 2003): “Fluctuaciones ciclicas en la produccion
maquilladora de Mexico”, Revista de la Frontera norte, n. 29, Tijuana. We must bear in
mind that according to official statistics (Informe de comercio exterior, Feb. 2003), the
trade deficit from March 2002 to February 2003 was 6,895 billion dollars. The maquil-
ladora industry produced an 18,919 billion dollar surplus, the rest of the industry a defi-
cit of 25,714 billion dollars. The exports of the maquilladora industry were of the order
of 78,084 billion dollars, and those of the other industries, 64,038 billion dollars.
24. This is what happened a few months prior to Lula’s assuming office in Brazil, until he
gave a full guarantee to the IMF that he would continue his predecessor’s policies.
25. To say that the key variable is the interest rate can seem paradoxical if we look at the bal-
ance of payments figures in a superficial manner... They actually indicate that portfolio
investments (bonds and shares) have declined considerably in favour of direct foreign
investment and the credit available with official institutions. We can therefore consider
the impact of the interest rates to be negligible. In fact, it would imply that gross inflows
have been confused with net inflows. The figures given are generally net figures. They
thus “mask” the volume of inflows and outflows. The aim of the high interest rates
policy is to retain and attract capital. The variations in interest rates are not enough to
avert major currency depreciations in the case of a flexible exchange regime. It is inter-
esting to note that there can be a difference between internal and external interest rates.
The former are composed of the prime rate and spreads (risk linked to the probability of
exchange rate variations, default in payment and a change of policy); the latter are an
expression of government policy. The gap in favour of the latter has a twofold objective:
to ensure that the capital stays — i.e. capital is attracted by these interest rates on the one
hand —, and to increase external credibility, which should lead to a reduction in the risk
premiums and stop pressure on the exchange rate. The cost in terms of recession and
the burden of the internal debt is considerable. See Farhi M. (2003): “A permanência da
vulnerabilidade externa” in: Política econômica em foco, n. 1 (Unicamp), Brazil. In the
same issue, it is interesting to read the article by Belluzo L. and Carneiro R.: “Globa-
lização e integração perversa”, which deals with external vulnerability in relation to the
restoration of a flexible exchange rate in Brazil.
26. It is not our intention here to discuss the comparative advantages of the fixed and flex-
ible exchange rates. We have already referred to Calvo and Mishkin’s arguments. It
should be noted that, in the early nineties, the various governments were forced to an-
nounce fixed exchange rates rather than flexible exchange rates — the financial markets
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would not have recognized their creditworthiness otherwise. On this aspect, a large
body of literature is now emerging; see Alesina A. and Wagner A. (2003): “Choosing
(and Reneging on) Exchange Rate Regime”, NBER, working paper. For a comparison
between exchange rate regimes adopted by Asia and Latin America, see Takatoshi Ito
(2003): “Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from East Asia for
Latin America”, LABEA, working paper n. 9.
27. But with a small reservation, namely that sometimes not following the IMF’s “recom-
mendations” can prove beneficial for the economy and that, in return, the latter can
have a positive effect on the exchange rate: after a major devaluation, the currency can
start to appreciate once again. The example of Argentina in 2003 is a convincing one in
this regard.
28. This is what explains the skepticism expressed by Calvo et alli (op. cit.) with regard to the
efficacy of the exchange rate regimes and the importance accorded by him to an im-
provement in the quality of institutions (cf. infra). It is also this search for creditworthi-
ness which has led governments to opt for a fixed exchange rate (within a band,
“pegged”) and to go for a more or less flexible exchange rate — to announce a fluctuat-
ing exchange rate would not have been received kindly, and the credibility of such a
policy for coming out of the crisis would have been poor.
29. The examples are numerous, whether in Mexico, with the tequila effect, or in Brazil,
during the 1998-99 crisis. It is not our intention here to analyse the more or less errone-
ous assessments of the extent of the financial crisis on the part of governments, assess-
ments that were ordinarily supposed to prevent a crisis, but which de facto ended up cre-
ating one. For an analysis of the Mexican example, see Griffith Jones St. (1996): “The
Mexican peso crisis”, discussion paper, IDS, Brighton. For an analysis of the Brazilian
crisis, we can refer to Palma G. (2003): “The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis, how to cre-
ate a financial crisis by trying to avoid one”, working paper, ILO and University of Cam-
bridge. It is also not our intention here to analyse whether other avenues — apart from
the ones advocated by the IMF — can be followed. Numerous examples attest to this
possibility. On this point, we can refer to two works by Stiglitz (2002 and 2003): “La
grande désillusion” and “Quand le capitalisme perd la tête”, published by Fayard, and to
research conducted by ATTAC, for example.
30. Conversely, the use of Minsky’s contribution to study the effects of “financialization”
on the behaviour of enterprises in South Asia is relevant. See Salama P. (2000): “Du
productif au financier et du financier au productif en Asie et en Amérique latine”, op.cit.
See also Schroeder S. (2002): “A Minskian Analysis of Financial Crisis in Developing
countries”, CEPA, working paper n. 9; Crotty J. and Dymsli G. (2002): “Can the Global
Neoliberal Regime Survive Victory in Asia? The Political Economy of the Asian Crisis”,
PERI, published study.
31. The credit system is less developed in Argentina and in Latin America than in other
countries: in the nineties, enterprises in developed countries financed 70% of their as-
sets through self-financing, 20% through borrowings, and 10% through share issues.
The respective figures for Latin America are 80% through self-financing, and 20% for
the rest. Investment, which dropped in 2002 and went up in 2003, was mainly financed
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through earnings and very little through loans. These earnings were also supposed to fi-
nance debt reduction. The advanced economies had a credit stock approximately equal
to 110% of the GDP; in Argentina, at the time of the Currency Board, it was 34%.
32. “The growth of direct foreign investment partly explains this modernization, in contrast
to what had been observed in the sixties and seventies. During this period, multina-
tional companies sought to satisfy the domestic markets in each Latin American coun-
try by exporting their production lines — considered obsolete in Europe and the United
States — by appealing to the government to maintain protectionism in order to protect
the appreciation of their productive capital (...) devalued elsewhere.” Salama P. (1978):
“Spécificités de l’internationalisation du capital en Amérique latine”, Revue Tiers
Monde, n.74, Paris.
33. See n. 1, v. 23, of “World Development” (1995), under the direction of Humphreys J.
34. One should, however, point out that this trend in the demand towards ever more so-
phisticated products — due to an increase in the middle classes’ purchasing power,
which was a characteristic of industrial growth in Brazil, as well as in Argentina and in
Mexico, during the thirty years following World War II —, has lost its momentum, with
negative consequences on the purchasing power of most of them because of the foreign
debt service. “The lower and middle” middle classes are getting relatively poorer, while
the “upper” middle class is getting richer, although less so than the “upper” class (10%
of the population). In the nineties, this distortion in the Lorentz curve towards income
bipolarization will feed a trend towards economic stagnation.
35. In Brazil, for example, 64.7% of total investment was made in the industrial sector in
1995, 22.7% in 1996, 13.3% in 1997, 11.9% in 1998, 26.6% in 1999, 17% in 2000, then
there was a rise in 2001, with 32.80% (SOBEET, 2000). Let us, however, not forget that,
from 2001 onwards, there has been a considerable decline in direct foreign investment.
36. Benavente J. M. (2002): “Cuan dinamicas son las exportaciones intraregionales lati-
noamericanas?”, Cepal, macroeconomic series on development, n. 12, Santiago, Chile.
37. UNCTAD: “Trade and Development”, report, 2002, Geneva.
38. Jomo K. S. (2001): “Growth after the Asian crisis: what remains of the East Asian
model?”, Unctad, G-24, discussion paper n. 10, Geneva.
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